In this paper, we propose novel generative models for creating adversarial examples, slightly perturbed images resembling natural images but maliciously crafted to fool pre-trained models. We present trainable deep neural networks for transforming images to adversarial perturbations. Our proposed models can produce image-agnostic and image-dependent perturbations for targeted and nontargeted attacks. We also demonstrate that similar architectures can achieve impressive results in fooling both classification and semantic segmentation models, obviating the need for hand-crafting attack methods for each task. Using extensive experiments on challenging high-resolution datasets such as ImageNet and Cityscapes, we show that our perturbations achieve high fooling rates with small perturbation norms. Moreover, our attacks are considerably faster than current iterative methods at inference time.
Introduction
In spite of their impressive performance on challenging tasks in computer vision such as image classification [25, 49, 51, 52, 20] and semantic segmentation [30, 5, 9, 59, 60] , deep neural networks are shown to be highly vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e. carefully crafted samples looking similar to natural images but designed to mislead a pretrained model. This phenomenon was first studied in [53] , and may hinder the applications of deep networks on visual tasks, or pose security concerns.
Two types of adversarial perturbations can be considered: Universal and Image-dependent. Image-dependent perturbations can vary for different images in the dataset. To generate these perturbations, we require a function which takes a natural image, and outputs an adversarial image. We approximate this function with a deep neural network. Universal perturbations are fixed perturbations which when added to natural images can significantly degrade the accuracy of the pre-trianed network. In this case, we seek a perturbation U with small magnitude such that for most natural images x, x + U can fool the pre-trained model. Unlike the iterative approaches proposed in the literature, we consider trainable networks for learning the universal perturbation.
From another viewpoint, adversarial attacks can be categorized as targeted and non-targeted. In targeted adversarial attacks, we seek adversarial images that can change the prediction of a model to a specific target label. In nontargeted attacks we want to generate adversarial examples for which the model's prediction is any label other than the ground-truth label. Considering all the possible combinations, we can have four types of adversarial examples: targeted universal, non-targeted universal, targeted imagedependent and non-targeted image-dependent. We elaborate on each of them in the following sections.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We present a unifying framework for creating universal and image-dependent perturbations for both classification and semantic segmentation tasks, considering targeted and non-targeted attacks with L ∞ and L 2 norms as the metric.
• We improve the state-of-the-art performance in universal perturbations by leveraging generative models in lieu of current iterative methods.
• We are the first to present effective targeted universal perturbations. This is the most challenging task as we are constrained to have a single perturbation pattern and the prediction should match a specific target.
• Our attacks are considerably faster than iterative and optimization-based methods at inference time. We can generate perturbations in the order of milliseconds.
Related Work

Universal Perturbations
First introduced in [35] , universal perturbations are fixed perturbations which after being added to natural images can mislead a pre-trained model for most of the images. The algorithm in [35] iterates over samples in a target set, and gradually builds the universal perturbation by aggregating image-dependent perturbations and normalizing the result.
[38] presents a data independent approach for generating image-agnostic perturbations. Its objective is to maximize the product of mean activations at multiple layers of the network when the input is the universal perturbation. While this method obviates the need for training data, the results are not as strong as [35] . A method for generating targeted universal adversarial perturbations for semantic segmentation models is presented in [34] . Their approach is similar to [35] in that they also create the universal perturbation by adding image-dependent perturbations and clipping the result to limit the norm. [36] proposes a quantitative analysis of the robustness of classifiers to universal perturbations based on the geometric properties of decision boundaries. A defense method against universal adversarial perturbations is proposed in [1] . It learns a Perturbation Rectifying Network (PRN) from real and synthetic universal perturbations, without needing to modify the target model.
Image-dependent Perturbations
Various approaches have been proposed for creating image-dependent perturbations. Optimization-based methods such as [53] and [8] define a cost function based on the perturbation norm and the model's loss. Then they use gradient ascent in pixel space with optimizers such as L-BFGS or Adam [24] to create the perturbation. While these approaches yield better results than other methods, they are slow at inference time as they need to forward the input to the model several times.
[18] proposes a Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to generate adversarial examples. It computes the gradient of the loss function with respect to pixels, and moves a single step based on the sign of the gradient. While this method is fast, using only a single direction based on the linear approximation of the loss function often leads to sub-optimal results. Based on this work, [37] presents an iterative algorithm to compute the adversarial perturbation by assuming that the loss function can be linearized around the current data point at each iteration. [26] introduces the Iterative Least-Likely Class method, an iterative gradient-based method choosing the least-likely prediction as the desired class. This method is applied to ImageNet in [27] . It also discusses how to effectively include adversarial examples in training to increase model's robustness. [11] proposes a method for directly optimizing performance measures, even when they are combinatorial and non-decomposable. [39] generates images unrecognizable to humans but classified with high confidence as members of a recognizable class. It uses evolutionary algorithms and gradient ascent to fool deep neural networks. Our work bears a resemblance to [6] in that it also considers training a network for generating adversarial examples. However, [6] does not provide a fixed bound on the perturbation magnitude, which might make perturbations detectable at inference time. It is also limited to targeted image-dependent perturbations. [58] extends adversarial examples from the task of image classification to semantic segmentation and object detection. For each image, it applies gradient ascent in an iterative procedure until the number of correctly predicted targets becomes zero or a maximum iteration is reached. Similar to [53] and [8] , this method suffers from being slow at inference time. [2] evaluates the robustness of segmentation models against common attacks. [31] suggests that adversarial examples are sensitive to the angle and distance at which the perturbed picture is viewed. [4] presents a method for generating adversarial examples that are robust across various transformations.
Several methods have been proposed for defending against adversarial attacks. While our focus is on efficient attacks, we refer the reader to [33, 57, 19, 47, 32, 50, 48, 54, 3, 13, 44, 16, 55, 45, 42, 56] for recent works on defense.
Generative Adversarial Perturbations
Consider a classification network K trained on natural images from C different classes. It assigns a label K(x) ∈ {1, . . . , C} to each input image x 1 . We assume that images are normalized to [0, 1] range. Let N ⊂ [0, 1] n represent the space of natural images 2 . We assume that K achieves a high accuracy on natural images. Therefore, if we denote the correct class for image x by c x , K(x) = c x for most x ∈ N. Let A K stand for the space of adversarial examples for the network K. Images in A K must resemble a natural image yet be able to fool the network K. Hence, for each a ∈ A K there exists x ∈ N such that d(a, x) is small and K(a) = c x , where d(·, ·) is a distance metric.
This framework can be easily extended to the task of semantic segmentation in which the correct class for each pixel needs to be determined. In this case, the segmentation network K assigns a label map K(x) = (K(x 1 ), . . . , K(x n )) ∈ {1, . . . , C} n to each image x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). The ground-truth prediction for image x is c x = (c x 1 , . . . , c x n ), and the set of adversarial examples
Universal Perturbations
Universal Perturbations were first proposed in the seminal work of Dezfooli et al. [35] . The paper proposes an iterative algorithm to generate the universal perturbation. It constructs the universal perturbation by adding imagedependent perturbations obtained from [37] and scaling the result. Unlike the iterative approach of [35] , we seek an end-to-end trainable model for generating the universal perturbation. Let us denote the set of universal perturbations Figure 1 : Training architecture for generating universal adversarial perturbations. A fixed pattern, sampled from a uniform distribution, is passed through the generator. The scaled result is the universal perturbation which, when added to natural images, can mislead the pre-trained model. We consider both U-Net (illustrated here) and ResNet Generator architectures.
We do not want the perturbation to directly depend on any input image from the dataset. We seek a function f : [0, 1] n → U K which can transform a random pattern to the universal perturbation. By changing the input pattern, we can obtain a diverse set of universal perturbations. In practice, we approximate f (·) with a deep neural network f Θ (·) with weights Θ. This setting resembles Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [17, 43, 15, 28, 21] in which a random vector is sampled from a latent space, and is transformed to a natural-looking image by a generator. In our case the range of the mapping is U K instead of N, and the generator is trained with a fooling loss instead of the discriminative loss used in GANs. We also tried using a combination of fooling and discriminative losses; however, it led to sub-optimal results.
There are several options for the architecture of the image transformation network f Θ (·). We consider two architectures used in recent image-to-image translation networks such as [22] and [61] . The U-Net architecture [46] is an encoder-decoder network with skip connections between the encoder and the decoder. The other architecture is ResNet Generator which was introduced in [23] , and is also used in [61] for transforming images from one domain to another. It consists of several downsampling layers, residual blocks and upsampling layers. In most of our experiments, the ResNet Generator outperforms U-Net. Figure 1 illustrates the architecture for generating universal perturbations. A fixed pattern Z ∈ [0, 1] n , sampled from a uniform distribution U [0, 1] n , is fed to a generator f Θ to create the perturbation. The output of the generator f Θ (Z) is then scaled to have a fixed norm. More specifically, we multiply it by min 1, f Θ (Z) p in which is the maximum permissible L p norm. Similar to related works in the literature, we consider p = 2 and p = ∞ in experiments. The resulting universal perturbation U is added to natural images to create the perturbed ones. Before feeding the perturbed image to the generator, we clip it to keep it in the valid range of images on which the network is trained. We feed the clipped imagex to the network K to obtain the output probabilities k(x) 4 . Let 1 c x denote the one-hot encoding of the ground-truth for image x. In semantic segmentation, c x ∈ {1, . . . , C} n is the ground-truth label map, and k(x) contains the class probabilities for each pixel inx. For non-targeted attacks we want the prediction k(x) to be different from 1 c x , so we define the loss to be a decreasing function of the cross-entropy H(k(x), 1 c x ). We found that the following fooling loss gives good results in experiments:
Alternatively, as proposed by [26] and [27] , we can consider the least likely class k ll (x) = arg min k(x), and set it as the target for training the model:
In practice, the losses in equations 1 and 2 lead to competitive results. We also found that for the Inception model, the logit-based loss used in [7, 8] yields optimal results. For targeted perturbations we consider the cross-entropy with the one-hot encoding of the target:
where t represents the target. Note that for the classification task, t ∈ {1, . . . , C} is the target class while in semantic segmentation, t ∈ {1, . . . , C} n is the target label map.
Image-dependent Perturbations
We consider the task of perturbing images as a transformation from the domain of natural images to the domain of adversarial images. In other words, we require a mapping f : N → A K which generates a perturbed image f (x) ∈ A K for each natural image x ∈ N. A desirable function f (·) must result in a low accuracy and a high fooling ratio. Accuracy denotes the proportion of samples x Figure 2 : Architecture for generating image-dependent perturbations. The generator outputs a perturbation, which is scaled to satisfy a norm constraint. It is then added to the original image, and clipped to produce the perturbed image. We use the ResNet Generator architecture for most of the image-dependent tasks. for which K(f (x)) = c x , while fooling ratio represents the ratio of images x for which K(f (x)) = K(x). Since we assume that the model achieves a high accuracy on natural images, these two metrics are highly correlated.
We consider two slightly different approaches for approximating f (·). The first approach is to parametrize it directly using a neural network f Θ (·). Hence, we seek Θ such that for most x ∈ N: K(f Θ (x)) = K(x). We also require that the perturbed image f Θ (x) look similar to the original image x. Hence, d(x, f Θ (x)) needs to be small for most x ∈ N, where d(·, ·) is a proper distance function. The second approach is to approximate the difference of natural and adversarial images with a neural network f Θ (·). We require that for most x ∈ N : K(x + f Θ (x)) = K(x) ≈ c x , and the L p norm of the additive perturbation f Θ (x) p needs to be small in order for it to be quasi-imperceptible. The second approach gives us better control over the perturbation magnitude. Hence, we will focus on this approach hereafter. Figure 2 shows the architecture for generating imagedependent perturbations. Input image x is passed through the generator to create the perturbation f Θ (x). The perturbation is then scaled to constrain its norm. The result is the image-dependent perturbation which is added to the input image. We feed the clipped imagex to the network to obtain the output probabilities k(x). We use loss functions similar to the universal case as defined in equations 1-3. At inference time, we can discard the pre-trained model, and use only the generator to produce adversarial examples. This obviates the need for iterative gradient computations, and allows us to generate perturbations fast.
Fooling Multiple Networks
Using generative models for creating adversarial perturbations enables us to train sophisticated models. For instance, we can consider training a single model for misleading multiple networks simultaneously. Suppose we have models K 1 , K 2 , . . . , K m trained on natural images. Let A K denote the space of adversarial examples for these target models, i.e. A K = {a ∈ [0, 1] n \N | ∃ x ∈ N : d(x, a) < , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , m} : K i (a) = K i (x) ≈ c x }, in which d(·, ·) is a distance function, is a pre-specified threshold and c x is the ground-truth for x. We can consider both universal and image-dependent perturbations. In the case of universal perturbations, we seek a mapping F : [0, 1] n → A K generating adversarial examples from input patterns. In practice, the function is approximated with a deep neural network F Θ . Figure 3 depicts the corresponding architecture. It is similar to figure 1 other than that the resulting perturbed imagex is fed to each of the pre-trained models. The loss function for training the generator is a linear combination of fooling losses of pre-trained models as defined in equations 1-3. Hence, we have:
in which {λ 1 , . . . , λ m } ⊂ IR is a set of weights chosen based on the difficulty of deceiving each target model. Table 2 : Fooling rates of non-targeted universal perturbations using L ∞ norm as the metric.
The architecture for image-dependent perturbations is similar except that inputs to the generator are natural images.
Experiments on Classification
We generate adversarial examples for fooling classifiers pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset [14] . For the Euclidean distance as the metric, we scale the output of the generator to have a fixed L 2 norm. We can also scale the generator's output to constrain its maximum value when dealing with the L ∞ norm. All results are reported on the 50,000 images of the ImageNet [14] validation set. Note that the contrast of displayed perturbations is enhanced for better visualization.
Universal Perturbations
Non-targeted Universal Perturbations. This setting corresponds to the architecture in figure 1 with the loss functions defined in equations 1 and 2. Results are given in Tables 1 and 2 for L 2 and L ∞ norms respectively. For most cases our approach outperforms that of [35] . Similar to [35] , a value of 2000 is set as the L 2 -norm threshold of the universal perturbation, and a value of 10 is set for the L ∞ -norm when images are considered in [0, 255] range 7 . We use U-Net and ResNet Generator for L 2 and L ∞ norms respectively. We visualize the results in figure 4 . Notice that the L 2 perturbation consists of a bird-like pattern in the top left. Intuitively, the network has learned that in this constrained problem it can successfully fool the classifier for the largest number of images by converging to a bird perturbation. On the other hand, when we optimize the model based on L ∞ norm, it distributes the perturbation to make use of the maximum permissible magnitude at each pixel.
Targeted Universal Perturbations. In this case we seek a single pattern which can be added to any image in the dataset to mislead the model into predicting a specified target label. We perform experiments with fixed L ∞ norm of 10, and use the ResNet generator for fooling the Inception-v3 model. We use the loss function defined in equation 3 to train the generator. Figure 5 depicts the perturbations for various targets. It also shows the top-1 target accuracy on the validation set, i.e. the ratio of perturbed samples classified as the desired target. We observe the the universal perturbation contains patterns resembling the target class. While this task is more difficult than the non-targeted one, our model achieves high target accuracies. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present effective targeted universal perturbations on the ImageNet dataset. To make sure that the model performs well for any target, we train it on 10 randomly sampled classes. The resulting average target accuracy for L ∞ = 10 is 52.0%, demonstrating generalizability of the model across different targets. [8] proposes a strong method for creating targeted image-dependent perturbations. However, its iterative algorithm is very slow at inference time. It reports attacks that take several minutes to run for each image, making it infeasible in real-time scenarios in which the input image changes constantly. FGSM [18] is a fast attack method but is not very accurate. In this work, we present adversarial attacks that are both fast and accurate.
Image-dependent Perturbations
Non-targeted Image-dependent Perturbations. The corresponding architecture is given in figure 2 with the loss function defined in equations 1 and 2. We use ResNet generator with 6 blocks for generating the perturbations. Similar to related works on image-dependent perturbations, we focus on L ∞ norm as the metric. Results are shown for various perturbation norms and pre-trained classifiers in Table  3 . Figure 6 illustrates the perturbed images. In this case the model converges to simple patterns which can change the prediction for most images. As we observe, the perturbations contain features from the corresponding input images.
Targeted Image-dependent Perturbations. For this task we use the training scheme shown in figure 2 with the loss function in equation 3. Figure 7 shows samples of perturbed images for fooling the Inception-v3 model. The perturbations are barely perceptible, yet they can obtain high target accuracies. Moreover, the perturbation itself has features 
Transferability and Fooling Multiple Networks
Several works have demonstrated that adversarial examples generated for one model may also be misclassified by other models. This property is referred to as transferability, and can be leveraged to perform black-box attacks [53, 18, 40, 41, 29, 10, 7] . We show that our generated perturbations can be transferred across different models. Table  4 shows the fooling ratio of a non-targeted universal attack trained on one network and evaluated on others. Each row corresponds to the pre-trained model based on which the attack model is learned. The last row of the table corresponds to a model trained to jointly mislead VGG-16 and VGG-19 models based on the architecture depicted in figure 3 . We see that joint optimization results in better transferability than training on a single target network. This is expected as the network has seen more models during training, so it generalizes better to unseen models.
Experiments on Semantic Segmentation
Current methods for fooling semantic segmentation models such as [58] and [34] use iterative algorithms, which are hand-engineered for the specific task, and are slow at inference. We demonstrate that our proposed architectures are generalizable across different tasks. More specifically, we show that architectures similar to those used in the classification task yield strong results on fooling segmentation models. We leave extension to tasks other than classification and segmentation as future work. Experiments are performed on the Cityscapes dataset [12] . It contains 2975 training and 500 validation images with a resolution of 2048 × 1024 pixels. Similar to [34] , we downsample images and label maps to 1024 × 512 pixels using bilinear and nearest-neighbor interpolation respectively.
Universal Perturbations
We first consider the more challenging case of targeted attacks in which a desired target label map is given. We use the same setting as in the classification task, i.e. the training architecture in figure 1 with the fooling loss defined in equation 3. In order for our results to be comparable with [34] , we consider FCN-8s [30] as our segmentation model, and use L ∞ norm as the metric. Our setting corresponds to the static target segmentation in [34] . We use the same target as the paper, and consider our performance metric to be success rate, i.e. the categorical accuracy between the prediction k(x) and the target t. Table 5 demonstrates our results. Our method outperforms the algorithm proposed in [34] for most of the perturbation norms. We also visualize the results in figure 8. We observe that the generator fools the segmentation model by creating a universal perturbation which resembles the target label map. We also demonstrates the resulting mean IoU for non-targeted attacks in Table 6 . 79.5% 92.1% 97.2% UAP-Seg [34] 80.3% 91.0% 96.3% Table 6 : Mean IoU of non-targeted perturbations for fooling the FCN-8s segmentation model on the Cityscapes dataset.
Image-dependent Perturbations
The targeted image-dependent task corresponds to the architecture in figure 2 with the loss function in equation 3. We use the same target as the universal case. Results for various norms are given in Table 7 . As we expect, relaxing the constraint of universality leads to higher success rates. Figure 9 illustrates the perturbations for L ∞ = 10. By closely inspecting the perturbations, we can observe patterns from both the target and the input image. As shown in Table 6 , image-dependent perturbations achieve smaller mean IoU by not having the universality constraint. The average inference time per image is 132.82 ms for the U-Net architecture and 335.73 ms for the ResNet generator 9 . 9 The time is measured on Titan Xp GPUs. L ∞ = 5 L ∞ = 10 L ∞ = 20 GAP 87.0% 96.3% 98.2% Table 7 : Success rate of targeted image-dependent perturbations for fooling FCN-8s on the Cityscapes dataset.
Discussion and Future Work
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficacy of generative models for creating adversarial examples. Four types of adversarial attacks are considered: targeted universal, non-targeted universal, targeted image-dependent and nontargeted image-dependent. We achieve high fooling rates on all tasks in the small perturbation norm regime. The perturbations can successfully transfer across different target models. Moreover, we demonstrate that similar architectures can be effectively used for fooling both classification and semantic segmentation models. This eliminates the need for designing task-specific attack methods, and paves the way for extending adversarial examples to other tasks. Future avenues of research include incorporating various properties such as transformation-invariance into the perturbations and extending the proposed framework to tasks other than classification and semantic segmentation.
